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According to the tradition, the Pythagoreans used to say that three 
kinds of people came to the Olympic Games: those who came to watch, 
those who came to compete, and those who came to make money. In 
Plato, this notion was incorporated into an elaborate theoretical notion 
of politics and ethics, one articulated most famously in The Republic 
(Plato 1974). In part of his political theory, Plato was very critical of 
democracy. I want to discuss his idea of the problems of democracy 
under two headings, presenting two different but related aspects of 
what I will call “the problem of a democratic ethic.” The fi rst aspect is 
what I will call the problem of democratic aspiration; the second, I will 
call the problem of democratic stability.
Plato’s Theory of Character
In Plato’s hands, the Pythagorean observation became a theory of types 
of character, of people who were typifi ed or characterized by their 
aspirations, or as Plato would have put it, by what they thought was 
good. Plato believed that everyone actually desired the good—what 
they (actually, if perhaps unknowingly) believed to be good, rather 
than what they desired to be that which determined their lives. And 
what they believed to be good was very closely connected to how they 
thought, so that people with different beliefs about the good were 
people with different ways of thinking. This theory contrasts with the 
more common modern view that all rational people think the same way 
when attempting to maximize effi ciently the satisfaction of their 
desires—only with different desires. Their beliefs about the good 
and as to how the good was connected to their most important traits 
of character, and to those of their rulers as well, determined the 
character of the society and of its politics. To understand Plato’s views 
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on democracy, as well as about the ethical problems of democracy to 
be discussed here, we must hence begin with a brief overview of Plato’s 
taxonomy of character.
Plato believed there were fi ve basic kinds of people (Plato 1974, 
books 8 and 9). One was the wisdom lover. This kind of person subor-
dinates all other interests to his interest in understanding the good. 
That understanding, according to Plato, goes beyond rigorous scien-
tifi c/mathematical understanding; it caps scientifi c/mathematical 
understanding off with a dialectical understanding that is not based on 
axioms or assumptions. The result is a deeply moral understanding of 
the world, which according to Plato, reveals the appropriate place for 
each thing as well as the appropriate fulfi llment of other needs a person 
has. It is a more scientifi c and rigorous understanding than our saints 
are normally credited with, and a more moral understanding than that 
of our scientists. Aristotle, Aquinas, and perhaps Einstein would be 
possible exemplars. If such people were to come to rule, the regime 
would be the best that humans could hope for.
The second type of person is the lover of honor/victory. Such people 
are characterized by courage, loyalty, and particular tenacity. While 
incapable of the highest sort of wisdom, they cling to the wisdom they 
are taught when young and consider it dishonorable to abandon it or 
the people whose lives it governs. They control their other desires on 
behalf of their love of honor and victory. Their virtues are the virtues 
that used to be associated with soldiers and athletes: team spirit, deter-
mination to win, fortitude, discipline—the sorts of qualities Vince Lom-
bardi, the famous U.S. football coach, might have admired. A society 
in which they rule is not as well organized as the previous one (owing 
to lack of depth of understanding), but it does have the stability of 
fi rmness and the virtue of military strength.
The third sort of person, according to Plato, is the money lover. While 
not primarily concerned either with wisdom or with honor, this person 
leads an organized life in which impulses are controlled on behalf of 
the effi cient pursuit of wealth. He does not indulge himself. He thinks 
in terms of effi ciency, based on the calculation of profi ts and losses. A 
society in which such people rule is devoted to commerce; and Plato 
calls it an oligarchy.
The fourth sort of person, according to Plato, is a lover of freedom 
and equality—the democratic man. Like the money lover, he is not 
concerned with wisdom or honor; but unlike the money lover, he is not 
disciplined in the pursuit of money either. He regards all desires as 
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equal and does not discipline the frivolous (unnecessary) to favor the 
essential (necessary). He thinks impulsively, and he values the freedom 
to indulge whatever he desires. The society governed by such values, 
Plato calls a democratic society.
Finally, the fi fth sort of person that Plato describes is the anarcho-
tyrannical man. Such a man is such a lover of “freedom” that his life 
is lawless, and he ends up being tyrannized over. He rejects any con-
straints whatsoever on his passions; as a result, he is dominated by the 
strongest of them, say, sexual passion, drug abuse, or the like. A society 
composed of such people inevitably comes to be dominated by a 
tyrant.
The Problem of Democratic Aspiration
This taxonomy raises a problem. It is in the very nature of democracy, 
according to Plato, that its collective aspirations do not include either 
wisdom or honor. The logic of this point is clear enough. Both those 
aspirations, if taken on collectively, require differentiating people in 
terms of quality, and this is deeply at odds with equality, one of the 
two basic values of democracy. People who regard all their desires as 
equal, and have also no interest in controlling them, cannot be given 
as much liberty as those who can control their passions, Plato believes; 
hence, there would be unequal degrees of freedom.1 In this respect, 
Plato would regard modern democracy as typical. It seems clear enough 
that in the United States, for example, neither wisdom nor honor is as 
highly regarded today as they have been either in other societies or, 
earlier on, in the United States’ own history.
And this is the fi rst of the problems of democratic ethics that I want 
to discuss: Is a society that does not collectively admire wisdom or 
honor a society with suffi ciently high aspirations for human life? By 
Platonic standards, democratic aspirations are not very high; and many 
people who would not otherwise agree with Plato might agree on this 
point.
Plato would probably not regard the United States as a paradigmatic 
democracy, however. Democracy for him meant rule by those who did 
not control their desires, which he assumed would be a large majority. 
It was to be contrasted not just with rule by the wise and rule by the 
1. Cf. Marxian and postmodern interpretations referred to in Cameron, chap. 11 in this 
book.
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honorable, but also with rule by the wealthy,2 by the businessmen 
who, he assumed, would be a small group. In the United States, he 
would say, we have something of a mix between oligarchy and democ-
racy. And that explains why we honor both money, on the one hand, 
and freedom and equality, on the other. To a certain extent these are 
at odds, of course. Left to itself, as if ever it could be, money does 
not end up being distributed equally; and so love of equality is to an 
extent in confl ict with love of money. Also, the majority is not com-
pletely free to equalize the distribution of wealth or money; some have 
seen this inability as an infringement on freedom, though, of course, 
some others see the equalization of property as just such an infringe-
ment. To a great extent, these confl icts are the stuff of U.S. domestic 
politics still today.
Even if, because of its oligarchic elements, U.S. democracy is not a 
pure Platonic democracy, this fact does not dissolve the problem of 
democratic aspiration, because aspiring to great wealth is surely too 
crude a goal for a society. Now in the course of making money, modern 
capitalist society has undertaken to conquer nature, using it to solve 
problems, and in general molding it to suit the needs of human beings. 
However, even the more exalted goals, of the conquest of nature and 
of ultimate triumph over material obstacles, toward a more comfort-
ably pleasant life—for example, eliminating illness and poverty—are 
also insuffi cient. After all, achieving wealth or overcoming illness and 
poverty seem more like means to something beyond those specifi c 
ends. If we fi nally did succeed at these projects, what would we next 
do? Would we thereby have achieved all that a society should hope to 
achieve? Many people would say no.
And there is now this further point: while a great part of our economy 
is devoted to meeting people’s genuine needs, an increasing proportion 
of it seems to be devoted simply to providing comfort and pleasure, 
including the unnecessary comfort and pleasure that Plato thought was 
characteristic of pure democracy. If we were tempted to ask, “Who says 
it is unnecessary?”—the very asking would show how much we have 
become like Plato’s democratic people, who will not and cannot distin-
guish between necessary and unnecessary pleasures. In fact, though 
Plato believed a democracy would include signifi cant diversity, he 
nonetheless thought there would be a characteristically democratic 
man and that such a man would be a pleasure lover. In light of this 
2. See Mulhern (2008).
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belief, it seems clear that we need to ask, instead, whether and how 
our collective aspirations can be raised.
But why is it the case that a society based on freedom and equality 
turns out to be a society in which there is such a striking predominance 
of concern with pleasure? Might the governments of such societies be 
covertly violating their pledge to allow freedom and diversity? Plato’s 
thought is, I believe, that a pleasure-oriented society need not be basi-
cally coerced in order to emerge. Pleasure is the default value of normal 
human life. All that is necessary for pleasure to dominate (even if 
incompletely and with only very small room for alternatives) is for the 
culture not to aspire any higher than that. To take freedom and equality 
for the good, according to Plato, will block the effects of the only anti-
dotes to the human inclination to lead lives of pleasure or comfort: 
people would follow their desires-qua-passions wherever those led. 
Such people stood in contrast to oligarchic men, who would control 
their desires for the sake of money; to men of honor, who would control 
their desires (including the desire for money) for the sake of honor; 
and to wise men, who would control all their desires for the sake of 
wisdom.
The Obstacle to Raising Aspirations in a Free Society
To understand the diffi culty of the problem, it will help to look back at 
an aspect of the origin and basis of U.S. democracy. Apart from its 
combination with oligarchy, U.S. democracy exhibits a number of quite 
distinctive aspects relative to classical notions of democracy; these 
aspects include the United States’ emphasis on individual and minority 
liberties. Freedom of religion is a good example. What happened to 
Socrates in democratic Athens—namely, being executed for impiety—
would be quite out of keeping with the U.S. conception of democracy. 
Some aspects of this particular conception of freedom fi nd their origins, 
to some extent, in the Reformation.
It is traditional to regard the people of the United States very much 
as the direct descendents of participants in the religious wars of 
seventeenth-century Europe, as does for instance John Rawls (1999) in 
“Justice as Fairness, Political not Metaphysical.” Neither Catholics nor 
Protestants had been able to establish the kind of consensus or hege-
mony that would have made religious freedom unnecessary; so the 
alternatives were constant war or agreements to disagree. As the 
diplomat-scholar Abba Eban has pointed out, the nations of the West 
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are used to coming to the right solution for such problems, but only 
after they have tried everything else. In this case, after fi ghting to the 
point where the destruction was unbearable any longer, they more or 
less agreed to disagree. Eventually, a consensus could arise about the 
sheer inappropriateness of attempting to enforce religious consensus; 
and freedom of religion became the norm.
It is important to keep in mind that the wars of religion were wars 
over the things most dear to people: their notions of which kind of a 
life is worth dying for and what kind of life people should lead. To 
Europeans who had been used to living in at least nominal agreement 
about these things, agreeing to disagree was quite a sacrifi ce. To some 
it may seem that people had simply come to their senses, and that 
fi ghting over religious differences now seemed just silly. Such thinkers 
should rethink how silly it might have seemed to people to have to 
fi ght wars with other countries in order to force or compel the adver-
sary to adopt one’s own way of government and/or to submit to a 
wholly alien conception of rights, or to have to fi ght and die rather than 
simply to accept such. Agreeing to tolerate different religions3 at the 
time must have seemed to those peoples not much different from what 
agreeing to tolerate cannibalism or the burning of widows would seem 
to us today. In sum, religious tolerance then must have been viewed 
by them in the way that religious intolerance would be regarded by us 
now; it must have been considered to be tantamount to tolerating the 
intolerable.
Learning to tolerate religious diversity was part of learning to live 
in a newly fragmented world, a world that came in parts, which did 
not necessarily fi t into a meaningful whole, a cosmos. In science, it 
meant that the world came to appear more like a mechanism than a 
morally coherent structure. And in social life, it meant the recognition 
that not just barbarians but your nearest neighbors could legitimately 
see the world in different ways, and thus also entertain different values. 
Whereas previously people could have relied on a certain basic agree-
ment on what was ‘good’ to hold society together, that was no longer 
suffi cient.
How to treat others can no longer be just a matter of whether they 
are good. When people have rights, and I have to respect their rights, 
I have to “divide” my judgment of them. As a person, I may judge 
3. Cf. the perspectives offered in this book by Baker (chap. 9) and Spinner-Halev (chap. 
10), as well as Doran (2008) regarding modes of tolerance “here and there” and “then 
and now.”
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The Problem of a Democratic Ethic 279
whether they are good. But, as a citizen and as the government, I judge 
them also on the basis of whether or not they operate within their 
rights. These judgments will not typically coincide. If they did, the 
struggle that resulted in the institutionalization of rights would not 
have taken place. That struggle came from disagreements over the 
good. And so, freedom and goodness are in an important sense at odds. 
There will be people who, by the standard of goodness, I will not fi nd 
reason to revere, but who, by the standard of political freedom, in our 
shared capacity as citizens of the same polity, I must respect.
One way to talk about this change is to contrast the earlier society, 
based on a shared conception of the good, with the society that ulti-
mately emerges, based on a conception of freedom (or rights) but also 
assuming a diversity of conceptions of the good (Rawls 1971, 446–452; 
see Sandel 1984, chap. 2). In such a society, rights and goods are to some 
extent at odds, for it is always tempting to universalize one’s concep-
tion of the good. But rights are obstacles to that intention. Hence, any 
individual’s conception of the good is in tension with his respect for 
the rights of others. In this sense, even the individual himself is some-
what fragmented.
How much freedom? If freedom is a means to peace, then minimum 
freedom is the amount that offers that peace. If the war is between 
Catholics and Protestants, then peace necessarily will involve basic 
freedom(s) for each. But the boundaries of freedom, somewhat like the 
boundaries of a state, work best when they are drawn in defensible 
places. Freedom for Catholics and Protestants might prove to be less 
defensible a line than would be freedom of religion in general. Thus 
more religions come to be tolerated on the very basis of the original 
model of toleration.
And freedom expands also for other reasons. For one thing, the 
model of removing divisive issues from the public domain, where such 
is possible, can itself become a tradition, as also a vitally astute political 
strategy. Moreover, freedom won at such a price, personal and/or 
social, becomes valuable to people and to societies in and of itself, and 
its exercise and extension are seen as valuable. Thus freedom goes 
beyond religion and even conscience on to “experiments in living,” as 
John S. Mill (1921) has called them, or “lifestyles,” as we would call 
them today (Smart and Williams, 1973; Warnock 2003).
By the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, the 
freedom of religion that was the outcome of the wars of religion and 
the rights of Englishmen for which the American Revolution had been 
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fought had been generalized into becoming the rights of man. By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, J. S. Mill, in one of the great docu-
ments of liberty, was arguing that liberty should extend to everything 
that primarily concerned a particular person rather than one’s neigh-
bors. Mill clearly meant to defend life as most U.S. citizens would 
today: according to different conceptions of the good. And much of 
Mill’s sensibility on these issues, especially about the extent of liberty, 
corresponds to our contemporary sensibility, even though there still is 
great controversy about particular important cases.
The function of this historical-philosophical overview for our pur-
poses here is to help show how diffi cult a solution to the problem of 
democratic aspiration would be. In a classic liberal democratic society, 
it is essential that freedom have precedence over particular conceptions 
of the good. It should be clear that in such a regime, appeals for higher 
aspiration—which are tantamount to appeals for a sort of shared notion 
of the good—are very likely to clash with this conception of freedom, 
for this vision of freedom concretizes itself as a resistance to any shared 
notion of the good; so any proposal for a shared higher aspiration that 
is not so abstract as to allow for indefi nitely great individuality is likely 
to be regarded as a blatant infringement on freedom. This clash is part 
of the signifi cance of the fi ght over diversity—often in the form of 
multiculturalism—in the United States in recent times. To propose a 
consensus over aspiration to a democratic populace such as we have 
in the United States today is not just to do unpopular work, it is 
perhaps factually to confl ict with our notion of freedom.
What then can there be to say about the problem of democratic aspi-
ration? Perhaps, just this: there is a large literature about the price of 
modern democratic life, and it is possible that the lack of agreement on 
elevated aspirations is simply part of that price. Some would say that 
individual liberty and material progress more than make up for the 
otherwise lowered aspirations. Less respect for wisdom, as opposed 
perhaps to pragmatically oriented science; loyalty to family and/or 
tribe, as opposed to universality; fortitude and military-type virtues, 
as opposed to say, universal compassion  .  .  .  may or may not be “losses,” 
but in any event—especially, in the eyes of modernity’s many defend-
ers—they are more than made up for by what has been gained. Low 
aspirations are not in themselves a menace to democracy, and hence 
not a threat to what will have been gained in the transition to modern 
democratic life. Might then the very search for a higher collective aspi-
ration in reality not amount to more than nostalgia? Perhaps in a world 
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The Problem of a Democratic Ethic 281
of individual liberty, as well as equality and material well-being, our 
collective aspirations just have to be the least common denominator of 
our existence; and our very highest aspirations, inevitably individual.4 
If the problem of collective democratic aspiration can be dismissed as 
a loss, or as an illusion of loss, may humans suffer as the species 
matures?
The Problem of Democratic Stability
Plato’s conception of politics was not merely taxonomic. It had a 
dynamic dimension as well. Plato regarded the regimes we have 
described as being hierarchically ordered in the order we presented 
them, and he believed that each was increasingly likely to decline into 
the regime beneath it. The immediate signifi cance of this belief for 
our problem is that he believed that democracy was extremely likely 
to decline/degenerate into anarchy/tyranny. Plato expects that, if 
people give free reign to their desires, these desires will become more 
and more demanding until they cannot be harnessed anymore with 
reasonable restraint. He predicts that ‘democracy’ will inevitably 
descend into ‘mob rule’, with no respect for law, and then into a 
‘tyranny’ headed by a “champion” of the people. De Tocqueville (1961) 
proposed a variant of this view by suggesting that in a democracy 
people might become so caught up in immediate personal gratifi cation 
as to have no capacity for participating in, supporting, or defending 
free government.5
In the United States today we think of our freedom as being pro-
tected by the constitution, but the question this belief raises is, Who or 
what will protect the constitution? Logically speaking, the fl aw here is 
that the constitution, which guarantees our freedom, guarantees it in a 
way that leaves us free to become the kind of people who will not 
defend our own constitution. This result could come about in any 
number of ways. One is that we might become so fl accid as a people 
that we are simply unable to defend the country from foreign enemies. 
Or we might, in quite the same way, become unable to defend ourselves 
from domestic factions. This outcome could occur with all the forms 
of democracy still in place. Or yet, we could lose vigorous democracy 
to apathy—say, if we simply did not vote, or did not otherwise 
4. Cf. Cameron (2008).
5. See also Guizot’s (1849) specifi c views on the matter in Ciprut (2008).
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‘participate’ in politics. Also, our constitution could come to lose its 
meaning if it came to be interpreted in ways suffi ciently different from 
its true meaning.
This, in fact, is our second problem of democratic ethics. If the con-
stitution that protects our freedom cannot protect itself, it would seem 
that some supplementary ethics is called for, in order to help protect 
that constitution and that freedom. The function of that ethic would be 
to prevent the occurrence of precisely the kinds of events that we have 
signaled as threats to the constitution. Such an ethic would have to 
keep us vigorous, competently involved in politics, and adequately 
qualifi ed to interpret our own constitution in a way that sustains it 
actively instead of degrading its meaning passively.
Here we need to distinguish between ethics and ethical theory. Ethics 
is taken to imply an existing way of life embodied in a living community: 
what Hegel (1952) called Sittlichkeit. By contrast, an ethical theory is a 
theoretical formulation of a standard for a way of life. What is needed 
in the fi rst instance is an ethic; but the question that faces us is how to 
bring about such an ethic.6 In a democratic free society, we can only 
attempt to bring it about by proposing an ethical theory that is in fact 
rationally persuasive to the majority. What we shall hence proceed to 
do next is to examine the various standard kinds of ethical theory and 
see to what extent they are potentially effective solutions to the dilemma 
of democratic ethics. The crux of the issue at hand here is the extent to 
which a democratic audience can be expected to be receptive to these 
various ethical theories. We saw earlier that the conditions of freedom 
did not make the democratic man receptive, collectively, to the argu-
ments for specifi c exalted aspirations. That unreceptiveness may have 
seemed optional in ways that the defense of freedom truly is not.
The Ethics of Freedom and Democratic Stability
The fi rst category of ethical theories briefl y to be discussed comprises 
an array of ethical—rather than political—theories that emphasize 
freedom. The fi rst and most famous proponent of such ideas was 
Immanuel Kant. Kant proposed freedom as a moral (his word for the 
ethical), not merely a political, ideal. Many defenders of rights and 
freedoms as moral ideals have drawn on Kant. The interpretation of 
6. For different approaches across space and time in such quests for a higher ethic, cf. 
Eichler (chap. 2), Guyer (chap. 3), Mulhern (chap. 8), Baker (chap. 9), and Cameron 
(chap. 11) in this book.
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Kant we will rely on for our discussion here is based on his Foundations 
of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1964). This interpretation gives more 
weight to Kant’s early, more rigorous, arguments and formulations 
than to his subsequent, and more nuanced, speculations that recent 
interpreters have preferred to emphasize.
This kind of theory emphasizes freedom as of morally direct impor-
tance. It claims that rights, as well as the concrete freedoms that they 
provide for, are morally primary; in that sense, it imparts to rights and 
freedom the essence of morality by seeing them as morally valuable in 
and of themselves, not as a means to anything else. The political impli-
cation of such a theory is meant to be that we must have free institu-
tions. Such theories are, of course, subject to criticism on serious 
substantive counts, which we need not go into here (MacIntyre 1981, 
chap. 4), since our task is not to engage in a general discussion of 
various moral theories. But there is one problem with such theories, 
which is specifi cally relevant to our problem of a democratic ethic.
As noted, our focus here is on the potential effective appeal of this 
ethic—as a solution to the threats to freedom and democracy. As also 
noted, democratic culture is one of comfort and pleasure. And this is 
exactly what constitutes the threat to freedom. The sort of thinking that 
is done in a democratic culture is of a Humean sort. As opposed to 
Plato’s wise person for whom reason determines the goals of life, for 
Hume (1888, 415) reason as ideated in democratic society is and ought 
to be the slave of the passions, because reason tells us the means to 
acquire what we, independently of reason, want. So the appeal of rights 
to a democratic society will have to be based either on an independent 
desire for rights or on a claim that rights are a means to something else 
that democratic (wo)man wants. Ironically, however, that “something 
else” is just what this sort of theory is not prepared to provide. This 
statement is equally true of Kant’s own theory, which addresses freedom 
more generally rather than dwelling on rights more particularly. But in 
whichever formulation of that theory, it is central that the nature of 
freedom discussed not be viewed as a means to the fulfi llment of some 
desire. In Kant’s general formulation of the defense of freedom, it is 
not a simple fact that freedom is not defended as a means to the satis-
faction of desire; it is the very nature of freedom that it is not such a 
means. If we ask what it is that is supposed, according to Kant, to bring 
about moral action, if it is not that the action is the appropriate means 
to an end, one illuminating answer is to compare it to Platonic courage/
fortitude, which specifi cally includes “the ability to resist desire.” In 
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Kant, this quality takes the form of “respect for [moral] law” or “respect 
for duty” (Kant 1964, 68–69). Yet, in its original Platonic form, the very 
absence of that attribute is one of the most defi ning traits (indeed, 
characteristics) of democratic culture.
Earlier I observed that, rather than being a pure Platonic democracy, 
the United States seems something of a “mix”—a combination—part 
Platonic oligarchy and part Platonic democracy. This observation, 
however, does not give us any help here. For example, what if the oli-
garchs have resources for resisting pleasure or comfort that “demo-
crats” do not have, especially if they are of the type imbued with what 
Weber called the “Protestant Ethic” (Weber 1958). But there is nothing 
intrinsically democratic about the oligarchic ethic. The oligarchic 
ethic has little about it to support equality; it supports freedom largely 
for the economically successful rather than for just anyone and 
everyone.
Benthamite Utilitarianism and Democratic Stability
There are other categories of ethical theory, which defend rights in a 
different way—as part of a more general theory of value, so-called 
‘utilitarian’ or ‘consequentialist’ theories. In one of its very prominent 
forms, notably Bentham’s (1973, 257–290), this approach actually con-
tained a direct attack on rights. Bentham’s point was that freedom is 
based not on rights, but on utility. Freedom is the means to the maximum 
satisfaction of our desires; and where it is not, it is not worth having. 
Here is an approach which—unlike the Kantian—has a purchase on 
the democratic man, because it defends freedom in a way that uses 
reason in the form that the democratic man understands it.
Benthamite utilitarianism is characterized by its aspiration to utter 
rigor. Bentham (1996) proposes, strictly quantitatively, to calculate the 
pleasure that a policy brings to each person, and then to compare poli-
cies in the same way: he advocates choosing the one that maximizes 
the total amount of pleasure. As in the case of all moral theories, there 
are many problems worthy of (re)consideration, but here we shall 
discuss only the ones with special relevance to our specifi c interroga-
tion of the palpable grounds and prospects for democratic ethics.
One such relevant problem, which has played a sizeable role in the 
repudiation of utilitarianism in favor of more Kantian political thinking 
by many political theorists in recent times and particularly in the trans-
formation of that domain by John Rawls (1971), has to do with equality. 
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While utilitarianism insists on egalitarianism, in the sense that each 
person’s pleasure counts the same, it does not point to egalitarian out-
comes because it allows ‘a great deal of utility for some’ to outweigh 
the fact that many others might not get very much at all. In other 
words, if an upper class lives in suffi cient luxury, this fact might per-
suade a utilitarian to overlook the poverty and misery of the lower 
classes, as long as the numbers come out right. And since the worse off 
might well be a majority, it is not clear how well this approach would 
appeal to a democratic society over the long run.
A second problem is that Bentham’s defense of freedom depends on 
freedom’s effectiveness in producing happiness. In situations where 
freedom and democracy had lost intrinsic appeal and the society could 
be most economically productive without either, the defense of freedom 
and democracy would be without support. Not so? Well try to imagine 
a Benthamite defense of the Weimar Republic in a Germany of the early 
1930s. In that sense, and to that extent, Bentham’s views are hardly a 
candidate for an ethic specifi c either to freedom or to democracy.
But there exists an important third problem. Bentham was for the 
dismissal of any distinctions between utilities that could not be quanti-
fi ed. This was an important part of the overall appeal of the “objectiv-
ity” claimed by his philosophy. And in a couple of ways, this is also a 
great strength of his position. In a scientifi cally oriented age, objectivity 
appeals in very important ways. Perhaps of even greater importance is 
one, somewhat more oblique, consideration: the emphasis on calcula-
tion, maximization, and effi ciency has about it a spirit that is more 
businesslike than apathetic. Those who are actively engaged in 
maximizing their pleasure or that of a society are not passive, but 
actively engaged people. In this sense, the spirit of Bentham’s outlook 
is helpful.
However, the other side of the coin of objectivity—and hence of the 
quantitative—is that Bentham was simply unable to give any reason 
for preferring poetry to ‘pushpin’ (a popular game in his time, or ‘tele-
vision’ today, for that matter) if someone derived more pleasure from 
the latter. At fi rst blush, this possibility would seem to be more relevant 
to our fi rst problem of democratic ethics—the problem of low aspira-
tions—and, indeed, it is. But it is also quite relevant to the problem at 
hand, in the here and now. For if the greater quantities of pleasure can 
be had from passive and/or nonpolitical engagements, then there 
would seem to be nothing to stave off the apathy that de Tocqueville 
was afraid of, or any of the sorts of self-indulgence that we feared 
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would undermine freedom. What if it were to turn out that what made 
people happiest was, say, to watch television all day? Worse still, what 
if it turned out to be drugs like crack that gave people the most 
pleasure? Is the latter not a proposition that the people have come 
perilously close to exploring in real terms, across the United States, at 
certain periods, in recent times?
Millian Utilitarianism and Democratic Stability
There is another version of utilitarianism, which was proposed by John 
Stuart Mill. In addition to defending individual rights in his On Liberty 
(Mill 1921) on a utilitarian basis, the success of which is a matter of 
controversy, Mill handled the ‘pushpin-poetry’ dilemma in his Utili-
tarianism (Mill 1957). He proposed to distinguish between pleasures 
not just quantitatively, but qualitatively as well. By way of a criterion 
of qualitative difference between pleasures, Mill has claimed that 
between certain pairs of pleasures, particular ones were preferred by 
all of those who had experienced both. The preferred ones he believed 
to be higher-quality pleasures, chosen even when they were not 
superior quantitatively. On this basis then, poetry was to be preferred 
to pushpin. And since the criterion of quality is based on experience, 
Mill believed it to be objectively grounded, even if it was not wholly 
so quantitatively.
I fi nd here something that speaks both directly and quite relevantly 
to our problem. Mill can be understood as attempting to convince those 
who are tempted by a life of television watching that they are missing 
out on something else, which they would appreciate much more if they 
would only give the latter a chance. True enough, such disposition may 
require considerable effort, but the argument is that it surely would be 
worth their while in a way that is in some sense on their terms. If it is, 
say, happiness that the democratic population seeks, then people will be 
making a mistake if they were to indulge themselves in these passive—
or, lower—pleasures. This is an argument that can be understood by, 
and even appeal to, democratic populations in no uncertain terms.
There is a serious weakness in this argument as an answer to our 
specifi c problem, however. But in order to articulate it we need to 
make a more general point fi rst. If nearly everyone who has tasted 
both vanilla and chocolate ice cream claims that the former is better, 
that fact does not make it such in and of itself. It only proves that “the 
majority” prefers vanilla to chocolate. In order for Mill to claim that he 
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has identifi ed something other than a preference by a set of more 
experienced observers, he has to show that there is something objective 
(innate to the products compared) lying behind taster-shared prefer-
ence. This problem is exacerbated in our case by the following facts 
regarding poetry and, say, television programs by the World Wrestling 
Federation. The people on the two sides of the issue—those who 
prefer poetry, on one hand, and those who prefer rougher pleasures, 
on the other—surely differ also in numerous other ways. And not 
necessarily because the former are likely to have had a higher 
education, to belong to the middle classes, or to have “more refi ned” 
tastes: the two categories may oppose neighbors who live different 
lives, who enjoy different universes, neither of whom is able, inclined, 
or willing to enjoy the pleasures dearest to the other. Different catego-
ries of people who, whether brought up similarly or differently, 
prefer different things—the one unaffected by high culture, and the 
other indifferent to the natural pleasures of rough comradeship or to 
some kinds of brutality—come to mind. Unless Mill convincingly 
can rebut that argument, his views are likely to be perceived by demo-
cratically inclined audiences as heavily imbibed in class bias. He will 
seem to be simply endorsing certain of the values of the refi ned and 
educated classes with considerable indifference to those of the other 
strata.
Practical Wisdom and Democratic Stability
The last of the categories we examine is not an ethic designed specifi -
cally to defend rights, but a type of ethic that independently of such 
preoccupation supports a mode of ethical life that would not under-
mine rights. I am referring here to the Aristotelian tradition of what is 
these days called “virtue ethics,” more specifi cally to the virtue that 
Aristotle calls phronesis, or “practical wisdom,” in his Nichomachean 
Ethics (book 6). It is the human ability to judge—correctly—in regard 
to things that “could be otherwise.” And it contrasts, primarily, with 
sophia, or “theoretical wisdom.” Unlike theoretical wisdom, which 
deals, according to Aristotle, with what is ‘necessarily so’, practical 
wisdom is not infallible. It deals only with things that can be known, 
but not with things that can be known with certainty. It is wrong to 
keep what does not belong to you, but if an intoxicated friend asks for 
his car keys back, it may not be wrong to keep them. How greatly 
affected by the alcohol does he need to be to justify keeping his 
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keys? This is a matter of judgment over which even the best of us can 
be wrong on occasion; but there is, nevertheless, a correct answer.7 
Perhaps this sort of judgment is the very virtue that we need to encour-
age, the better to protect our freedom.
This proposal raises the question “Is there such wisdom, and what 
does it say in any given case?” Aristotle addresses this query head-on. 
If you want to know what the wise judgment is in any given case, ask 
the wise man. While this may seem to provide a trivial or circular 
answer, it is actually illuminating in a most important way, for it refl ects 
Aristotle’s confi dence in a consensus about who is a wise man. This 
was a confi dence based on the conviction that he lived in a society 
where people agreed, not unanimously, but by and large, on what was 
good and what was bad. And this belief was connected with other 
convictions that supported it: for example, that man was a “political” 
animal; that his society, namely the polis, was the natural unit of asso-
ciation; that human beings were so constructed as to be able to under-
stand not just the natural but also the social world. We moderns do not 
agree on such things. It is therefore not surprising that the notion of 
practical wisdom—embodied by phronesic men’s worldview—cannot 
play the same role in our society that in his time Aristotle envisioned 
it to be playing in his.
To see how and why this statement is true, we can turn to the vexed 
issue of abortion. The abortion issue does not lend itself to solution by 
simple appeal to the enumerated rights of the constitution, because no 
such rights are enumerated, and because both sides appeal to rights. 
Nor does it yield to a broader appeal to freedom, since both sides 
appeal to that as well. One emphasizes freedom in the form of the right 
to life; the other places the accent on freedom in the form of the right 
to the pursuit of happiness. The fi rst sees in liberty the freedom to live 
within traditional parameters, while the second interprets freedom as 
the liberty to explore the limits of human individual life. Thus the abor-
tion debate today (cf. Eichler, chap. 2 in this book) is but a concretiza-
tion of two different conceptions of the good life, approached 
differently—albeit right inside the one and same society: distinct democ-
ratizations within the very same polity.
In the United States this protracted controversy has plagued all the 
branches of government, but most centrally the judiciary. In effect, the 
7. Even though some things, degrees in qualities among them, do remain in the para-
doxical domain to this day: see, for instance, Gross (2008).
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people have attempted to deal with it by allowing their judges to solve 
it for them. But this approach has been quite unsatisfactory in the eyes 
of many among the people, and it has resulted in a controversy about 
the judges themselves. The opponents of abortion see the judges who 
allow it, not as objectively wise men, but as mere partisans8 of a particu-
lar conception of the world—sometimes referred to as “secular human-
ism”—which has a lot in common with what Mill (1921), in chapter 3 
of On Liberty, described as “pagan self-assertion.” And because the 
dispute over abortion is, at a deeper level, also a dispute over the nature 
of a good life, and not just a dispute over this specifi c right, it often 
fi nds itself elevated to the level of the old Aristotelian contention as to 
who exactly is a wise person. These disputes then take the concrete 
form of prolonged debate over who is fi t to be ‘a judge’ (‘wise’). And 
any prolongations of the sort can help spin enough rope to last for 
years, quite substantially interfering with the exercise of government—
the workings of the U.S. Senate, for instance. One may expect to see 
such long-winded debates again, this time in regard to stem cell 
research.
The problem with using “practical wisdom” arises in addition to two 
other problems that should be also noted. First, Aristotle in person 
never doubted that it would be only a small minority, a subset of 
the best people, who could or would exercise practical wisdom. For 
him, it was basically an elitist notion, hardly typical of democratic 
populations. Second, despite its name, practical wisdom is not basic 
reasoning of the means-ends sort. It is a kind of judgment about the 
appropriateness of certain qualities to certain contexts—for example, 
the ability to understand whether, in a given situation, it would be 
courageous or rash to fi ght and cowardly or sensible to retreat. These 
are not means-ends dilemmas for Aristotle. They are issues only for 
people who are antecedently committed to courage. Like Kant’s own 
“respect for law,” Aristotle’s “practical wisdom” in a sense fi nds its 
analogue in Plato. And although there are some quite considerable 
contrasts when compared to a Humean mode of means-ends reason-
ing, the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom is more comparably 
similar to Plato’s notion of wisdom; and as we saw, the very absence 
of respect for that sort of wisdom is one of the defi ning qualities of 
democracy for Plato.
8. On this activist aspect of the notion of “partisanship,” cf. Cameron, chap. 11 in this 
book.
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Conclusion
The problem of aspiration that we thought useful to mention is not in 
and of itself a mortal threat to democracy. It even might not amount to 
much more than yet another simple fact about the modern world. In 
contrast, the problem of democratic stability is just such a mortal threat. 
We should note also that there remains considerable question as to 
whether the problem of democratic aspiration should be looked at in 
isolation. In the fi rst place, all the approaches with which we hoped to 
solve the problem of instability appealed in different forms to values 
of wisdom and/or honor, the very absence of which in fact defi ned the 
problem of democratic aspiration. Lest we forget, Plato himself had 
argued that the decline he expected from democracy into anarchy/
tyranny was simply one stage of the decline that begins with the descent 
from the regime of the wisdom lover to the regime of the honor lover, 
continuing inexorably down to the money lover and on to the freedom/
equality lover. We may think that, if we do not aspire any higher, the 
alternative would be to stay put where we are, but quite apart from 
Plato’s philosophical argument on this score, there is the simpler point 
that if a person circling a mountain halfway up does not concern 
himself with going any higher, s/he eventually will yield to gravity 
and end up even lower.
“Men do not live by bread alone.” Nor do they live by freedom and 
democracy in a space devoid of everything else. Full-fl edged human 
beings, whose lives can sustain both democracy and freedom, entertain 
a conception of what makes a life worthwhile. They may have fervent 
faith in freedom and democracy, but, as mature human beings, they 
will also have developed a conception of the good. The two major 
problems of democratic ethics, discussed earlier, are in fact two aspects 
of the separation of the right and the good—the consequences of giving 
social primacy to ‘right’ over ‘good’. As noted, when we separate the 
right and the good, we also disconnect the principles of political life 
and the very precepts of individual life. A society committed most 
deeply to rights and freedom, and not solely to the good, is very likely 
to be a divided society, because its members must believe in something 
else as well—the nature of a good life. There is nothing in a free society 
to assure that everyone will agree on such. Indeed, there is a strong 
tendency to make the very absence of such an agreement (“diversity”) 
a criterion of genuine freedom. History suggests that at least some such 
disagreement is important for the idea of freedom to take hold. U.S. 
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society, for instance, has long assumed that, at least nominally, it could 
reach no agreement, attain no consensus, on the good life; and it increas-
ingly is able to celebrate the very fact.
Hence, we should not be surprised, under those circumstances, that 
we moderns are unable collectively to raise our sights or even jointly 
to protect our freedoms by appealing to a consensus around some 
ethical theory. If we did have such a consensus, our freedom would not 
be so important to us, and surely its pursuit would not be such a fragile 
undertaking.
Though we cannot appeal to a consensus about a central ethic in 
order to protect our democracy, it does not follow that there cannot 
obtain one such central code, or that we cannot aspire to creating one. 
Such a consensus, however, would have to be about a conception that 
was at once seriously unifi ed and richly diverse. For, if it were not 
unifi ed, it could not mobilize our notions of the good in defense of our 
freedom; and if it were not diverse, it would be signifi cantly at odds 
with freedom itself.
And so we are forced to keep struggling on, toward fi nding the 
appropriate relationship between the freedom we seek and the good 
for which we search. The struggle to fi nd the correct relationship 
between the freedom and the good is similar in certain ways to the 
struggle to ensure the optimal relationship between unity and diver-
sity, a form of struggle for which Plato is our fi rst and best guide. And 
as Plato makes clear, it is essential for our success in such struggles that 
we do not assume that we have found the answer already, be it in detail 
or in a basic outline. Specifi cally, that requires of us not to assume that 
freedom around the world will take the form that it has espoused in 
Western Europe, in North America, or in some other exceptional spot. 
Perhaps an honest struggle of this tenor and magnitude is the best 
recommendation one can make, in closing, in regard to an ethic of 
democracy, a democratic ethic, or democratic ethics, at this time.
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